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Implying Standing to Sue from Statutory Authority:
Applicability of a "Fair Reading" Standard
I. Introduction
A survey of the numerous comments' exploring the law of standing reveals
an opinion shared by those commentators that the federal courts must come to
grips with this doctrine lest they further confuse both themselves and the practic-
ing bar.2 Federal courts generally have relied heavily on certain key cases to
develop standing law.' Although these cases have raised the issue and have
afforded the Supreme Court ample opportunity to define the limits of the law of
standing, the doctrine remains confused and without consistent direction.
It is submitted that steering this unsteady course has become a burden for
principally two reasons. First of these considerations is that federal courts never
have adequately reviewed the historical foundation of the theory supporting
standing law. The doctrine should be viewed strictly in the context of the con-
stitutional minima found in article III of the United States Constitution. It
was not without regard to the parameters of available common law remedies
that this nation's forefathers drafted the article III limitations. Accordingly,
1 See generally Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court-A Functional Analysis, 86 H~Av.
L. REV. 645 (1973). See also Griswold, Rationing Justice-The Supreme Court's Caseload
and What the Court Does Not Do, 60 CORN. L. REv. 335 (1975); Note, Recent Standing
Cases and a Possible Alternative Approach, 27 HAST. L. J. 213 (1975) ; Note, Federal Stand-
ing: 1976, 4 HoFSTRA L. REV. 383 '(1976); Note, Standing and the Propriety of Judicial
Intervention: Reviving a Traditional Approach?, 52 NOTRE DAME LAW. 944 (1977). For
articles providing significant background for the specific questions raised in this note, see
Albert, Standing to Challenge Administrative Action: An Inadequate Surrogate for Claim for
Relief, 83 YALE L. J. 425, 476 (1974); Capellitti, Vindicating the Public Interest Through the
Courts: A Comparativist's Contribution, 25 BUFF. L. REV. 643 (1976); Fuchs, Prerequisites to
Judicial Review of Administrative Agency Action, 51 IND. L. J. 817, 911 (1976); Jaffe, Stand-
ing to Secure Judicial Review: Public Actions, 74 HARv. L. REV. 1265, 1296 (1961); Jaffe,
The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-Hohfeldian of Ideological Plaintiff, 116
U. PA. L. REV. 1033 (1968); Wolff, Standing to Sue: Capricious Application of Direct Injury
Standard, 20 ST. Louis U. L. J. 663 (1975). Cf. Jaffe, Public Interest Law-Five Years
Later, 62 A.B.A.J. 982 (1976).
2 Professor Davis recently highlighted this problem in his treatment of two 1976 Supreme
Court decisions. In referring to Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, 426
U.S. 26 (1976) (standing denied) and Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth,
428 U.S. 52 (1976) (standing granted), Professor Davis remarked:
The two main cases of 1976 are both extreme. What is worse is that one is extreme
in one direction and the other is extreme in the opposite direction. The product is
something less than evenhanded justice. The whole law of standing is so confused
and cluttered and yet so often decisive of litigation that it is vital to parties that
the lower courts and practitioners especially need Supreme Court guidance. The two
1976 decisions, taken together, subtract from the needed guidance.
K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES § 22.00-1 (1976 & Supp. 1977) '(emphasis
added).
3 Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation, 429
U.S. 252 (1977); Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976);
Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26 (1976); Warth v. Seldin,
422 U.S. 490 (1975); United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures
(SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669 (1973); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972); Association
of Data Processing Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970); Flast v. Cohen, 392
U.S. 83 (1968).
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comprehension of the standing doctrine could be advanced by studying the
framework of the common law mechanisms available to private citizens to
challenge, pro bona publico, government action or inactin. This historic
overview, largely ignored by the federal courts, has been analyzed fully elsewhere
and is beyond the scope of this note.'
The second consideration, by contrast, focuses on the more practical aspects
of demanding that a party demonstrate standing to bring his claiin before a
federal judge. Federal courts have developed certain tests designed to prevent an
overuse of the federal judiciary. Specifically, the tests for standing afe instru-
mental in relieving congestion in the federal courts by requiring parties to resort to
reform via the legislature in accomplishing that which is more appropriately
matter for the legislature's concern. It is obvious from these standing cases that
the courts fear government by litigation.6
The Constitution establishes a republican form of government which man-
dates that policy matters be formulated by the elected representatives of the
people. As a co-equal, but separate and distinct branch of the government, fed-
eral courts will not allow parties to abuse the judiciary by asking it to articulate,
address, and resolve these policy matters. The federal judiciary is designed to
protect the rights of the parties before it; it is not designed to create rights or
obligations not already imposed by the Constitution or by the legislative and
executive branches. Any attempt to use the federal judiciary for purposes other
than for the protection of rights already in existence will be met by the courts
with an analysis under standing law.
In deciding the standing question, the courts may be called upon to balancd
certain constitutional values. The separation of powers issue, for example, may
conflict with an individual freedom guaranteed by the Constitution. If the courts
can be satisfied, however, that Congress has expressly established public policy,
then the separation of powers concern is sufficiently resolved. The judiciary
would be free to add judicial gloss to the legislatively articulated policy aims.
To the extent that Congress has removed the potential for accusing the courts of
usurping the legislature's policy-making powers, the courts should not fear gov-
ernment by litigation. Congress would have legislated public policy and would
have thereby mollified any federal court concern which would require an in-
vocation of the standing doctrine to insure against that fear.
Once the fear of court intervention in setting public policy is allayed,
standing doctrine further requires that the party presenting himself before the
court be a proper party to bring the action. The courts have developed an
"injury in fact" test to measure that party's standing to sue.' The standard
4 Foremost among the historical treatments accorded standing law are Jaffe, The Right
to Judicial Review, 71 HARV. L. REv. 401 (1958) and Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial
Review: Public Actions, supra note 1.
5 See Jaffe, supra note 4. See also Berger, Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is It a
Constitutional Requirement?, 78 YALE L. J. 816 (1968).
6 Many critics have investigated the propriety of judicial intervention into public policy-
making. See, e.g., Kurland, Toward a Political Supreme Court, 37 U. Cmr. L. Rv. 47 (1969);
Government by litigation, rather-than by legislation, seems to be foremost on the minds of
those commentators.
7 Although this requirement dates to Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923), it
was first articulated in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968). The plaintiffs in Flast challenged
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requires that any party seeking relief in the federal courts first be prepared to
demonstrate sufficient injury, economic or otherwise, to satisfy the court that
he has been harmed by the defendant in some judicially cognizable way.' Mere
interest in a problem or the mere fact that an interest is widely shared will not
be sufficient to demonstrate standing, regardless of the intensity with which the
plaintiff asserts the interest and regardless of how qualified he is to evaluate the
problem and seek a remedy.'
The "injury in fact" test therefore addresses another concern of the federal
courts. The test serves to insure that the parties before the courts present an
adversary relationship."0 The adversary system presumptively assures the courts
that all issues to be raised are addressed with intelligence and diligence, for each
party would have a stake in the outcome of the case or controversy. For all of
the foregoing reasons, federal courts conclude that no party has standing to sue
absent a showing of judicially cognizable "injury in fact."'1
II. Statutorily-Based "Injury in Fact"
Injury may be demonstrated in a number of ways. Infringement of one's
as unconstitutional an appropriation and expenditure of federal funds for the use of parochial
schools to finance, among other things, the purchase of textbooks for those schools. The
plaintiffs claimed that Congress thereby provided religious institutions with financial support
contrary to the establishment clause of the First Amendment. The Court focused on the
injury requirement by indicating that "the taxpayer must [first] establish a logical link between
that status and the type of legislative enactment attacked." Id. at 102. Without that
link, there could be no injury; without injury, there can be no case or controversy; and absent
a case or controversy, there is no justiciable issue.
The injury requirement resurfaced in Association of Data Processing Organizations, Inc.
v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970), in the course of deciding whether the plaintiff was an
"aggrieved" person under the meaning of Section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5
U.S.C. § 702 (1970). The Court extended the Flast reasoning to cases in the administrative
setting and, at least for the present, firmly entrenched in the doctrine the requirement that
some indication of concrete injury to the plaintiff is a sine qua non of justiciability.
8 Cases subsequent to Data Processing have held that the quantum of injury is not
determinative; the existence of a judicially significant "injury in fact" is the key factor. The
Supreme Court in SCRAP stated that an "identifiable trifle" of "injury in fact" is enough to
establish standing to sue. 412 U.S. at 689.
9 405 U.S. 727.
10 The Supreme Court in F1last reminded litigants that the standing doctrine serves to
"limit the business of federal courts to questions presented in an adversary context and in a
form historically viewed as capable of resolution through the judicial process." 392 U.S. at 95.
11 Data Processing and Sierra Club identify the two other prongs of the three-part standing
test. The second prerequisite of standing is that the plaintiff show that he was "arguably
within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guar-
antee in question." 397 U.S. at 153. At least one commentator argues that this "zone of
interests" test should be allowed to die without fanfare. See K. DAvIs, supra note 2, at §
22.00-7; see also id. at § 22.02-11. The Supreme Court nevertheless adheres to this second
prong of the three-prong Sierra Club test and lower courts occasionally consider the question.
See, e.g., Window Systems v. Manchester Memorial Hospital, 424 F. Supp. 331 (D. Conn.
1976).
The third prerequisite of standing is that the plaintiff show that the harm he alleges would
cease to exist if the court's remedial powers were invoked. In other words, the remedy sought
must stand to redress adequately the injury, lest the plaintiff be accused of asking the court to
pass judgment on a matter over which it has no practical capacity to correct. The "adequacy
of remedy" test is wholly consistent with article III requirements of justiciability because
fundamental principles of judicial economy dictate that the federal courts hear no disputes
absent a showing that they will ultimately possess effective remedial powers. Moreover, the
federal courts may not issue advisory opinions. The "adequacy of remedy" test is discussed
in another context at note 61 infra. Cf. note 49 infra.
[October 1978]
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own constitutional guarantees is an obvious example. Violation of statutorily-
imposed duties where there is a concomitant express statutory provision granting
standing is another.1 2 A third way is available through clear implication from a
relevant statute of a congressional conferral of standing."
The Supreme Court does not contest the power of Congress to create legal
rights by statute which, if invaded, would confer standing on a plaintiff.'4 The
only restriction on congressional power in this regard is that it not authorize an
exercise of judicial power in the absence of a case or controversy. 5 If, however,
standing is to be implied from relevant statutory language, two inquiries must be
made: (1) To what extent may the court imply that the statutory language in
question creates a right to bring a claim for relief, and (2) to whom does that
right flow, or, in other words, on whom is standing thereby conferred?
The extent to which federal courts may imply a congressional grant of
standing provides the focal point of this note. This analysis ponders the question
of whether or not the courts, under proper circumstances, could imply standing
from statutory language purporting to confer standing in ways more subtle than
ever before condoned by the judiciary. Answering this question requires a
thorough comprehension of the purposes and scope of the legislation in question.
To that end, an analysis of the statute's legislative history is necessary.
But one is not without case law to assist in measuring the extent to which
such implications of standing are possible. The Supreme Court has already
stated that implications of congressional grants of standing may be made, but
only insofar as such conferral can be clearly implied from the statute." It is
contended, however, that the Court, in establishing this rather high threshold,
was harboring fears of increased incidence of government by litigation. One of
the purposes of this note, therefore, is to explore the extent to which the Supreme
Court, when the public policy underlying the legislation is clearly expressed, could
relax this stringent requirement of finding in the statute a "clear implication" of
standing. Since public policy can be expressed either through the language of
the statute itself or through expressions found in the legislative history, it is sub-
mitted that in such cases questions as to separation of powers difficulties dissolve,
and implying a congressional grant of standing from a fair reading7 of the
relevant statutory language therefore would not compromise the justiciability
issue.
Answering the second inquiry concerning to whom the implied right to
bring a claim for relief flows will sometimes involve a balance of constitutional
values, but will largely depend on the facts of each case. It is submitted that if
a fair reading of a statute implies congressional conferral of standing on a
plaintiff, and if public policy is clearly expressed, then the plaintiff has satisfied
12 See, e.g., Copyrights Act, 17 U.S.C. § 501(d) (1976); Interstate Commerce Act, 49
U.S.C. § 5(2) (1887); Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 26b "(1887).
13 422 U.S. at 501; Animal Welfare Institute v. Kreps, 561 F.2d 1002, 1005 (D.C. Cir.
1977).
14 405 U.S. 727.
15 U. S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
16 See note 14 supra.
17 It is suggested that the "fair reading" standard proposed in this note should refer to
the understanding that an ordinary and reasonable person would acquire from reading the
language of a relevant statute.
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the "injury in fact" test for standing, and the right to challenge the defendant's
actions thereby implicitly flows to the plaintiff. The second purpose of this
note, therefore, is to show how the express statement of public policy by Congress
can be used by the courts to determine whether the plaintiff has sustained merely
an undifferentiated and indefinite injury, or has attempted merely to use the
federal judiciary as a forum to air a generalized grievance, or actually has
suffered a judicially cognizable injury.
III. Has Congress Articulated Public Policy?
Since the presence or absence of an express statement of public policy is
critical in determining the extent to which fedeial courts may imply standing
from statutory language and in defining the types of parties to whom those rights
shall flow, it is logical to inquire first into whether or not Congress has specifically
articulated that policy. It has been noted i" that the principal fear confronting
federal courts in dealing with standing cases is that the judiciary would be
transformed into another forum in which plaintiffs could voice their general dis-
satisfaction with the government if standing doctrine were not raised as a bar
to such litigation. In a system of government which places a premium on gov-
ernment by the people through their elected representatives, any notion that
anyone should be able to turn to the judiciary to seek a more sympathetic ear
when the legislature does not follow his wishes is repugnant to this basic con-
stitutional structure. Standing doctrine is interposed by the courts to protect
against such abuse of the judiciary.
A. Has Congress Acted?
Congress cannot be heard to complain that the courts have usurped its
policy-making powers if policy is clearly articulated in a statute. The courts are
bound to exercise such power as is consistent with their duty to interpret policy
once it is set by the legislature."5
Analysis of congressional action or inaction on this front may be ac-
complished by a survey of the legislative history of the statute. If counsel for a
plaintiff alleging standing within the framework suggested by this note must
undertake research of congressional expression of public policy, two points should
be kept in mind: (1) Is there a clear expression of public policy apparent from
the relevant statutory language itself? (2) If not, does the legislative history of
the act indicate a clearly expressed basis from which public policy may be
unambiguously discerned or clearly implied? Succeeding on the first level of
inquiry should always lead to success before the court, assuming, of course, that
the court wishes to adopt the "fair reading" standard proposed by this note.
The second level of inquiry, however, affords the court a great deal of
latitude so that counsel's success will be directly related to the persuasiveness of
18 See text accompanying note 6 supra.
19 The Supreme Court's power to act as final arbiter in determining federal law finds




his approach. It is contended that, in his analysis of the relevant legislative
history, counsel should try to draw the line as closely as possible to an unambigu-
ous expression of policy. Courts predictably will be less likely to allow implication
of a congressional grant of standing from a fair reading of the relevant statute
when articulation of the public policy can be discerned only from less than an
express pronouncement of that policy..
B. Implying Congressional Conferral of Standing: Current Law
Once the court can be satisfied that Congress has articulated public policy
and thus has removed any suspicions concerning separation of powers problems,
the practitioner must next turn to applying those expressions of policy to his
particular fact pattern to imply standing from the relevant statute. The relevant
language may derive directly from the expression of public policy found in the
statute itself2" or from the statutory provisions made in order to implement that
policy.",
Animal Welfare Institute v. Kreps22 provides an excellent starting point,
for it states the current law concerning implications of congressional grants of
standing. Moreover, it shows how the express statements of public policy can be
used in conjunction with the relevant statutory language to allow for an im-
plication of standing. The plaintiffs in Animal Welfare were environmental
groups challenging the government's waiver of a moratorium imposed by the
Marine Mammal Protection Act23 (MMPA) on the importation from South
Africa of baby fur sealskins. The waiver allowed an importer, who had applied
for a permit, to import some 13,000 sealskins from his 1976 harvest. After the
customary administrative review was conducted, during which the plaintiffs
made their objections known, the acting director of the National Marine
Fisheries Service granted the permit. Plaintiffs immediately moved in the
district court for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction.
The district court denied the motion and dismissed the suit on the grounds that
plaintiffs lacked standing to sue.24
The court of appeals reversed and held that plaintiffs did have standing
since the MMPA implicitly conferred such a right on them. The court found
that the plaintiffs had clearly demonstrated that they had suffered an injury of
the type defined by the statute.2
The Animal Welfare court looked to the Supreme Court standard for im-
plying standing from statutes. In Warth v. Seldin,2 the Court indicated that
Congress can confer standing through its selection of statutory language either
by an express grant of standing or through a conferral clearly implied from the
20 See, e.g., Marine Mammal Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407 (1972); Housing
and Community Development Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5301-5318 (1974).
21 See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 94-167, § 9, 89 Stat. 1003, 1006 (1975) °(Congress included
a "lobbying clause" to prohibit certain use of funds appropriated to a commission; see text ac-
companying notes 50-64 infra.).
22 561 F. 2d 1002.
23 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407 (1972).
24 561 F. 2d at 1005.
25 Id. at 1008.
26 422 U.S. 490.
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statute.27 The court in Animal Welfare found no trouble with meeting the
stringent "clear implication" standard. It pointed to the language in the MMPA
which gives permit applicants and "[a] ny party opposed to such permit [applica-
tion an opportunity to] obtain judicial review of the terms and conditions of any
permit issued by the Secretary under [the MMPA] or of his refusal to issue such
a permit."28 It is undeniable that the court correctly perceived the plaintiffs in
Animal Welfare as parties opposed to the permit granted to the importer. As to
the "injury in fact" issue concerning plaintiffs' standing challenge the Secretary's
granting of the permit, there could be no dispute; Congress had expressly con-
ferred standing on them.
But the court went a step beyond and implied standing to challenge the
waiver of the moratorium as well. The court viewed the interrelationship
between the waiver and the permit procedures. It also noted the policy reasons
for enacting the MMPA ab initio, that is, to deter continued slaughter of baby
seals by artificially reducing demand for coats manufactured from their pelts.29
In light of public policy as articulated by the Congress and in view of the inter-
relationship between the waiver and permit procedures, the court concluded
that "to find Congress gave [plaintiffs] standing to challenge permits, but not to
challenge waiver regulations, would be to exalt form over substance."2 "
IV. Implying Congressional Conferral of Standing: A Suggested
Alternative Approach
The court's position in Animal Welfare is wholly consistent with current law
regarding the statutory bases for standing. The plaintiffs in Animal Welfare
were able to meet the stringent "clear implication" standard without much
difficulty. It is submitted, however, that future analysis of standing cases in
this area should include a willingness to distinguish cases in which there is no
clear congressional expression of public policy from those cases in which such
articulation clearly can be identified from the relevant statute or its legislative
history. There is no argument that for the former group of cases the more
stringent "clear implication" test is to be preferred because the fear that the
court might be usurping the legislature's policy-making authority multiplies as
congressional statements of policy become more difficult to decipher. Anything
short of requiring a "clear implication" of a conferral of standing would be
tantamount to the court's making public policy by defining the class of persons
upon which Congress intended to convey this benefit, instead of interpreting
public policy from the declarations offered by Congress in enacting the relevant
27 422 U.S. at 501.
28 16 U.S.C. § 1374(d)(6) (1972) (emphasis added), cited with approval in 561 F. 2d
at 1005.
29 Id. at 1010. The court quoted from the MMPA:
[M]arine mammals have proven themselves to be resources of great international
significance, esthetic and recreational as well as economic, and it is the sense of the
Congress that they should be protected and encouraged to develop to the greatest
extent feasible commensurate with sound policies of resource management and that
the primary objective of their management should be to maintain the health and
stability of the marine ecosystem. . ..
16 U.S.C. § 1361(6) (1972) '(emphasis added).
30 561 F. 2d at 1006.
[October 1978]
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statute. It is therefore understandable that the federal courts would be loath
to grant standing to all possible plaintiffs without first scrutinizing the statute
for a "clear implication" of a statutory basis therefor.
A. The Problem
It is possible, however, that many plaintiffs who should benefit from
congressional acts may be frustrated because they cannot meet the severe "clear
implication" standard. What makes such a possibility more unsavory is the ad-
ditional factor that Congress may have clearly expressed public policy. If the
expression of public policy is clear,31 then it is submitted that federal courts
should permit a conferral of standing to be deduced from merely a fair reading
of the statute in question. This less stringent "fair reading" standard, when
combined with the prerequisite of the court's finding a clear expression of public
policy, would satisfy the first step in meeting the "injury in fact" test, that is,
determining whether or not an injury cognizable at law does exist. If so, the
plaintiff will still have to show how he fits into the class of persons protected by
the statute as one who has suffered the legally significant injury in a perceptible
and differentiated manner, but the court will not be able to deny the plaintiff
access for want of an injury at all.
B. Two Illustrative Cases
Two recent courts of appeals cases are helpful in showing how plaintiffs
with interests arguably protected by the policy considerations for which a statute
had been enacted would be frustrated under the current "clear implication"
standard, but would gain access to the court through the proposed "fair reading"
standard. It is contended that these cases demonstrate how the "fair reading"
test would serve to promote public policy while the "clear implication" standard
would at the same time tend to frustrate such policy.
1. The City of Hartford Case
The plaintiffs in City of Hartford v. Town of Glastonbury32 were a munic-
ipality and two of its low-income residents. They challenged the propriety of
a Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) ruling which led to
31 For federal courts to act within their constitutional authority, they must limit them-
selves to protecting rights while simultaneously refraining from creating rights where none
existed before. The latter is a power exclusively reserved for Congress. See text accompanying
note 6 supra. Accordingly, if the courts are to adopt the proposed "fair reading" standard,
it is highly recommended that a congressional grant of standing be implied only in such cases
as would not require the courts to make any assumptions en route to determining whether the
parties before them are injured by the alleged violation of the relevant statutory provisions.
If the courts would misinterpret the policy reasons underlying some statutory authority, then
presumably the courts could also decide to grant standing to parties upon whom Congress
would never have considered conferring standing. It is submitted that to avoid the problems
cited herein, federal courts should demand proof of clear statements of public policy before
allowing parties to argue that a "fair reading" of the statutory language relevant to their
respective cases implicitly confers standing upon them. See also text accompanying note 68
infra.
32 561 F. 2d 1032.
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HUD's approval of federal grants-in-aid to several suburban communities in the
Hartford area. The Housing and Community Development Act of 197433
required HUD to elicit from each community applying for the grants-in-aid an
"expected to reside" (ETR) figure. This figure represented an estimate34 of the
number of low-income people who would be expected to move into the com-
munity in the coming year. As the ETR for a given community increased, its
proportionate share of the available federal funds would increase.
The defendants, several suburban communities of Hartford, relied on
HUD's conditional waiver of that statutory requirement for 1975 and did not
submit ETR figures for 1975." 5 Plaintiffs charged that defendants' collective
failure to submit the ETR figures, if not enjoined, would cause the plaintiffs
irreparable harm. If the grants to the defendants had been disapproved," the
funds under the program would have been reallocated to other metropolitan
areas in Connecticut. Since the city of Hartford would have stood in a priority
position in this reallocation,3 7 plaintiffs claimed that defendants' collective failure
to submit ETR figures would result in depriving the Hartford metropolitan area
of an increased share of those grants-in-aid. 8
The district court agreed with the plaintiffs and issued a permanent in-
junction preventing the suburban communities from spending any funds received
through the program.39 The district court found that the additional increment
that would have been made available to the other Connecticut metropolitan
33 42 U.S.C. § 5303 (1974).
34 The plurality opinion referred to it as an "estimated guess." 561 F. 2d at 1049.
35 The defendants in City of Hartford had three options: (1) They could have submitted
ETR figures for 1975, (2) they could have consented to HUD's calculation of their ETR
figures, or (3) they could have refrained from submitting ETR figures and could have refused
HUD's calculation simply by indicating on their applications the steps they would later take
to "identify . . . more appropriate [ETR] figure[s] by the time of [their] second year sub-
missionts]." See 561 F. 2d at 1036-37.
36 Plaintiffs alleged that the HCDA mandated that the defendants' applications be dis-
approved. See City of Hartford v. Hills, 408 F. Supp. 889 (D. Conn. 1976).
37 Id. at 895.
38 Plaintiffs alternatively alleged that had the defendants submitted ETR figures, the
defendants' allocations would have been larger. Larger allocations to Hartford's suburban
communities would, according to plaintiffs, promote the expansion of low and moderate housing
opportunities in Hartford's suburbs. Id. at 892. It was alleged that such expansion would
help relieve Hartford of the burdens of increasing concentration of low-income families in
American cities.
The Second Circuit in its en banc plurality opinion summarized this argument by saying:
"Plaintiffs allege that the Act is designed to encourage the wealthy to return to the cities and
to facilitate the movement on the poo to the suburbs." 561 F. 2d at 1050. The opinion then
adds a footnote indicating that the court would "accept [plaintiffs'] interpretation only for
purposes of discussion [but the plurality believed that it was] by no means clear whether
Congress sought to encourage inter-city spatial deconcentration or intra-city spatial decon-
centration or both." Id. at n.2 (emphasis in original).
It is submitted that the distinction with which the plurality opinion apparently struggles
has no bearing on the clear position of the HCDA that the purpose of that statute is to
assist cities such as Hartford. For the purpose of measuring as a prerequisite to the proposed
"fair reading" standard the clarity with which public policy is articulated (see discussion at
note 31 supra), it is contended that the manner in which the deconcentration should occur is
inconsequential. That such deconcentration occurs at all is of paramount importance.
Accordingly, since the foregoing reflects the policy behind the HCDA, and since that
policy is clearly expressed by Congress, the plurality opinion's problems with the manner by
which the desired deconcentration would occur would not pose any problems regarding a
potential application of the "fair reading" standard for implying standing as proposed by this
note. See also 408 F. Supp. at 901, n. 50.
39 408 F. Supp. at 907.
[October 1978]
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areas, when remitted to Hartford, would have promoted congressional intent by
relieving Hartford from further concentration of low-income people in the
central city."
A divided panel of the Second Circuit affirmed." On rehearing en banc,
the Second Circuit reversed and based its holding on the theory that the
plaintiffs lacked standing.42
The alignment of the Second Circuit judges in City of Hartford is significant.
Four judges agreed that the plaintiffs had demonstrated both a legally cognizable
"injury in fact" and the judicial capacity to frame adequately a remedy to
ameliorate the harm. 3 Four judges disagreed and held that plaintiffs met neither
condition and therefore lacked standing.4
The Chief Judge agreed with the latter group that the plaintiffs lacked
standing, but he reached only the "adequacy of the remedy" issue. In concurring
with those four judges denying standing, the Chief Judge agreed that the
plaintiffs would not have benefited personally from the injunctive relief they
sought. If the defendants were enjoined from spending the HUD funds, they
would have faced two alternatives: the defendants could have done nothing
and thereby would have forfeited the funds, or they could have submitted the
ETR figures and thereby would have frustrated any benefit the plaintiffs may
have realized. The Chief Judge concluded that when a remedy sought by the
plaintiffs would leave the defendants with two equally available alternatives,
one which would benefit the plaintiffs and one which would not, a remedy
cannot be framed to ameliorate the alleged harm, and therefore, there could be
no standing to sue. 5
He chose not to address the "injury in fact" issue directly, but rather called
upon his colleagues to leave "the [other] issues raised by both the plurality
opinion and the dissent.., for another day."4 " The Chief Judge elaborated:
Hartford maintains that it will receive the very benefit Congress intended
if the suburban towns successfully reapply for community development
grants: relief from the burden flowing from concentration of low income
people, all too often members of minorities, in the central cities.... In our
system of coordinate powers, the courts must ordinarily respect legislative
judgments concerning the efficacy of statutes .... Any other policy would
require the judiciary to indulge in an independent assessment of the wisdom
of Congressional action. To declare a duty prescribed by Congress too
"speculative" to be enforced by an aggrieved litigant is tantamount to
saying it shall not be enforced at all. Therefore, . .. I would be exceedingly
loathe to label "speculative" a chain of causation that, on the [plaintiffs']




The public policy as articulated in the HCDA was to alleviate pressures on
40 See id. at 894-95.
41 561 F. 2d at 1044.
42 Id. at 1052.
43 Id. at 1059 (Oakes, J., dissenting).
44 Id. at 1052.
45 Id. at 1053 (Kaufman, C.J., concurring).
46 Id. at n. 1.
47 Id. at 1052-53 (emphasis added).
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metropolitan areas experiencing increasing concentrations of low-income
families within their city limits. This policy was clearly discernible from the
legislative history of the HCDA and was acknowledged by the City of Hartford
court." It is presumable that at least four judges would have held that the
plaintiffs would have had standing under a "clear implication" standard and that
four judges would have denied standing under such a test. The Chief Judge
reserved judgment on the issue and nothing can be drawn from his opinion to
make a prediction as to what his position would have been under the "clear
implication" test.
It is, however, supportable that the Chief Judge would have granted stand-
ing under the proposed "fair reading" standard. Public policy was clearly
articulated by Congress. No problems with the separation of powers question
remained. All that remained would have been an implication of standing from
a fair reading of the statute. The statute was intended to assist metropolitan
communities. Hartford is such a community; if any person attempts to do any-
thing to impede a metropolitan community's enjoyment of the benefits available
under the HCDA, standing to challenge such conduct should be implied. More-
over, the injury could not be speculative, for Congress did expressly impose duties
on the defendants and HUD which, if breached, would cause a harm that the
statute was designed to avoid, that is, a disproportionate distribution of federal
appropriations.49
2. The Mulqueeny Case
Mulqueeny v. National Commission on the Observance of International
Women's Year, 1975, 0 provides another instance of where an application of the
proposed "fair reading" test would have resulted in a holding more in line with
expressed public policy than did in fact result under either the court's analysis
of the standing issue or the "clear implication" standard found in Animal
Welfare.
The plaintiffs in Mulqueeny challenged the National Commission on the
Observance of International Women's Year, 1975,51 for having allegedly en-
48 Id. at 1050.
49 The speculativeness of an alleged injury is critical. It bespeaks the plaintiff's need to
demonstrate a causal connection between the defendant's conduct and the alleged harm. In
City of Hartford, the failure of the suburban communities to submit ETR figures, according
to the plaintiffs, should have resulted in a disapproval of their grant applications. Such dis-
approval would relinquish certain funds which would be reallocated to other Connecticut ap-
plicants, of which the city of Hartford was the leading contender. The causal connection
between 4efendants' conduct and the plaintiffs' injury in City of Har.rtford is clear; there can
be no problem with speculativeness.
The issue is raised here, however, because the succeeding discussion of the Seventh
Circuit's treatment of Mulqueeny v. National Commission on the Observance of International
Women's Year, 1975, 549 F. 2d 1115 (7th Cir. 1977) will reveal that court's concerns re-
garding speculativeness. The Seventh Circuit's categorizing as speculative the Mulqueeny
plaintiffs' alleged injury will be analyzed in light of City of Hartford and in connection with
the proposed "fair reading" test. See text accompanying notes 62-67 infra.
50 549 F. 2d 1115.
51 The Commission was originally established by Executive Order and was comprised of
35 private citizens and two members of each House of Congress. Members were to serve with-
out compensation, but travel expenses allowed under 5 U.S.C. § 5703 (1970) were to be
reimbursed. Executive Order No. 11,832, 40 Fed. Reg. 2415 (1975). The Commission's life
was extended by Executive Order No. 11,889, 40 Fed. Reg. 54765 (1975). Congress then
perpetuated the Commission's existence by enacting Pub. L. No. 94-167, 89 Stat. 1003 (1975).
[October 1978]
[Vol. 54:102]
gaged in lobbying and publicity-seeking tactics urging support of the Equal
Rights Amendment and advocating opposition to a constitutional amendment
limiting abortion. 2 Plaintiffs asserted that this activity contravened the Com-
mission's statutory powers. In that regard, plaintiffs alleged that such lobbying
was neither consistent with the purpose for which Congress established the Com-
mission nor within the purview of its powers as delineated by the enabling leg-
islation. 3 They petitioned the district court to grant relief in the form of: (1) a
judicial termination of the Commission, (2) an injunction framed to enjoin the
Commission from committing these alleged statutory violations, or (3) an order
compelling the appointment of individuals to the Commission who, by their
opinions on the ERA and abortion issues, would transform it into a "fairly
balanced" commission. 4
Subsequent to plaintiffs' filing of the complaint, Congress appropriated
$5,000,000 for the necessary expenses of the Commission55 and expressly pro-
hibited the use of these funds for "lobbying activities.'"" Plaintiffs accordingly
amended their original complaint to ask for a preliminary injunction ordering
the Commission to refrain from spending any of the appropriated $5,000,000
for lobbying purposes."
The Commission attacked plaintiffs' standing to bring the action. Plaintiffs'
responding affidavit attempted to demonstrate that plaintiffs, Mulqueeny and
Boehnke, had standing as co-chairpersons of the Illinois branch of "Stop ERA,"
an organization intent on undermining any movement which would promote
the ratification of the ERA. Plaintiffs asserted that they had spent a great deal of
time, effort, and personal funds in support of this "keen" interest by coordinating
the efforts of many other resource-contributing Illinois residents who shared the
belief that the ERA would have harmful effects on women and society. Plaintiffs
alleged that the Commission's "illegal [lobbying] actions" threatened imminent
destruction of their four years of work and would impugn their hard-earned
credibility and goodwill.
Plaintiffs argued that this affidavit sufficiently established themselves as
parties "aggrieved by agency action" and that they therefore enjoyed the right
to challenge the Commission pursuant to Section 10 of the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act (APA) .58 The district court found that the plaintiffs had satisfied the
standing requirement and issued a preliminary injunction enjoining the Com-
mission from spending any of the Commission's funds for lobbying in support of
any proposed legislation or constitutional amendment under consideration by any
legislative body. The Cpmmission appealed from the issuance of the preliminary
injunction, again claiming that the plaintiffs had no standing to request the relief
they had received from the district court.
52 549 F. 2d at 1119.
53 Id. at 1119-20.
54 Id. at 1119. The district court did not consider the first and third prayers for relief.
Id. at n. 13.
55 Authorization for the federal appropriation is noted in Pub. L. No. 94-167, § 9, 89 Stat.
at 1006 (1975).
56 Id. See also 549 F. 2d at 1118.
57 549 F. 2d at 1119, n. 12.
58 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970).
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Rejecting plaintiff's attempts to prove that they were aggrieved parties
within the meaning of Section 10 of the APA, the Seventh Circuit vacated the
preliminary injunction and remanded the case to the district court with directions
to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint for lack of standing."5 The Seventh Circuit con-
cluded that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate sufficient "injury in fact" to give
them standing to challenge the Commission's conduct. The court found that the
plaintiffs had suffered no concrete judicially cognizable harm. The court found
trouble with the relationship between plaintiffs and defendant and concluded
that "only through reliance on speculative inferences [could the connection]
between defendant's conduct and plaintiffs' claimed harm [be] apparent" '
Owing to the speculative nature of the injury, the court, in dictum, found that
standing would not exist because the remedy plaintiffs requested would not
ameliorate the harm."'
The Seventh Circuit's problems with the Mulqueeny plaintiffs' assertions
of standing were similar to those confronting the Second Circuit in City of Hart-
ford. In each case, plaintiffs had shown how clearly Congress had expressed
public policy, yet in neither case could they convince the court that Congress
meant to grant them standing to benefit from that public policy. Since the
court in its Mulqueeny opinion showed no willingness to adopt a less severe
standard regarding any aspect of standing law, and since the holdings of Animal
Welfare and similar cases have entrenched the "clear implication" standard in
the law of standing, it is arguable that if the plaintiffs in Mulqueeny had tried
to imply a Congressional conferral of standing, the Seventh Circuit would have
applied the "clear implication" standard. 2 Plaintiffs in Mulqueeny would have
fared no better than those in City of Hartford. The statute applicable in the
Mulqueeny case contained no language which would have withstood a "clear
implication" test. Nothing in the enabling legislation or appropriation provisions
supported a clear implication that plaintiffs would be harmed in a judicially
cognizable way by violations thereof.
However, since Congress had articulated public policy in a clear manner
in each case, it is submitted that if the plaintiffs had argued for implications from
the relevant statutes of congressional conferrals of standing, then the courts
59 549 F. 2d at 1122.
60 Id. at 1121.
61 Id. at 1121-22. Although the Seventh Circuit cited the correct "adequacy of remedy"
issue (see note 11 supra) in its dictum, it misinterpreted the nature of the remedy which
plaintiffs sought. In describing what it perceived to be the plaintiffs' objective, the court said:
It is wholly conjectural whether the exercise of remedial powers possessed by the
federal court, as desired by plaintiffs, would result in the maintenance of the status
quo in the Illinois legislature's posture on the issue of ratifying the Equal Rights
Amendment. . . . [I]t is . . . plausible that, were the injunctive relief requested by
plaintiffs granted, the legislature would nevertheless elect to ratify the ERA.
549 F. 2d at 1121. This investigation into the speculative effect of the remedy is misplaced.
The object of plaintiffs' seeking a permanent injunction was not the Illinois legislature. Rather,
the Mulqueeny plaintiffs merely sought to enjoin the Commission from illegally spending any
part of its appropriation for "lobbying activities." They wanted to see that the policy con-
ditioning the appropriation of $5,000,000 for the Commission would be honored. Their
objective was not to enjoin Commission-member lobbying per se, but rather to prevent the
financing of such activity with federal funds.
62 See discussion of Animal Welfare Institute in text accompanying notes 22-30 supra.
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should have been willing to review those arguments in the light of "fair readings"
of those statutes.
The relevant statute in Mulqueeny read: "[No] funds authorized [under
this act] may be used for lobbying activities."'" The "lobbying clause" was in-
cluded at the insistence of many Congressmen who feared that the Commission
members would attempt to use part or all of any federal appropriation to pro-
mote their lobbying efforts. The legislative history of the National Women's
Conference Act evidenced those fears. 4 Public policy could not have been more
clearly defined. Only one question remained: Who was to enforce it?
A "fair reading" of the statute would have left the Mulqueeny court with
no choice but to grant the plaintiffs standing to challenge the Commission's
conduct. Assuming that the plaintiffs' purpose was limited to asking the court
to restrain the Commission from using the funds illegally, it appears that stand-
ing should have been granted in Mulqueeny. Plaintiffs' counsel should have
insisted that, given the legislative history and the purpose of including the
"lobbying clause," a fair reading of the statute would have justified the Seventh
Circuit's implying from such statutory language a congressional grant of standing
to any party who could demonstrate (1) that he had engaged in lobbying activity
in opposition to that allegedly engaged in by the Commission and (2) that he
had been or would be injured by the illegal use of those funds.
Requiring a party to show that he had engaged in lobbying activity con-
trary to the Commission's alleged lobbying would serve to satisfy the require-
ment that an adversarial proceeding would take place. This has been identified
above as a valid aim of standing doctrine.6"
Requiring a party to show the nature of that injury, on the other hand,
goes to the heart of the issue. Under a "clear implication" standard, the court
cannot be sure that the Congress intended to grant plaintiffs standing to enforce
public policy. Under a "fair reading" test, however, the court could make the
requested implication of a statutory conferral of standing without compromising
any of the reasons f6r which standing doctrine exists.
A fair reading of the "lobbying clause" in view of the policy considerations
for which it was included in the statute would result in a finding that Congress
meant to allow enforcement by anyone the act was designed to protect. That
the statute was drafted so as to insure against government-subsidized lobbying is
beyond any reasonable doubt. Anyone active in a lobbying effort contrary to
that for which government funds were being used should have standing, by a
fair reading of the relevant statute in Mulqueeny, to enforce the policy under-
lying the letter of the statute. In Mulqueeny, the plaintiffs did not object to
lobbying by Commission members per se. They did, however, object to an
alleged use of federal funds by the Commission members to support their lobby-
ing efforts. A fair reading of the statute, accordingly, would have convinced
63 Pub. L. No. 94-167, § 9, 89 Stat. 1003, 1006 (1975).
64 The Seventh Circuit's review of the legislative history of the appropriations acts led
it to point out that "[a]cute concern that any funds appropriated to the Commission would be
misused for improper purposes surfaced during the hearings in both Houses." 549 F. 2d at
1118, n. 9.
65 See note 10 supra and accompanying text.
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the court that public policy against Commission use of federal appropriations for
lobbying purposes would have been promoted by implying from the statute a
congressional grant of standing.
The Seventh Circuit's concern that the Mulqueeny plaintiffs had alleged
only speculative injury also would have been assuaged by using a "fair reading"
standard. As noted in the discussion of City of Hartford,6 injury should not be
deemed speculative if the chain of causation alleged by the plaintiff is sub-
stantially similar to the chain of causation against which the statutory language
was designed to protect and which Congress thereby must have considered
plausible. Measured under these standards, the injury alleged in Mulqueeny was
not speculative. The legislative history of the relevant statute was replete with
expressions of fear that public funds would be used to promote lobbying on a
volatile political issue. To say that Congress did not intend to recognize that the
Commission's use of its funds for lobbying purposes would cause injury to those
lobbying against positions taken by that Commission's members would be to
exalt form over substance. Alleged injury is speculative only if it can be sup-
ported solely by tenuous inferences drawn from an indefinite relationship
between plaintiff and defendant. On the other hand, when there is a "clear
implication" of standing in a relevant statute, an alleged injury is not specula-
tive." Since the proposed "fair reading" standard is designed to substitute for
the "clear implication" standard when public policy is clearly discernible, an
injury should not be considered speculative when standing is conferred through
a "fair reading" of a relevant statute.
V. Conclusion
The "fair reading" standard proposed in this note should not be expanded
to include cases in which public policy is not clearly articulated by Congress.6"
In such cases, court intervention through granting plaintiffs standing would
result in judicial usurpation of the powers over policy-making reserved for
Congress. The fears of increased government by litigation would be well-founded
in such instances. The "fair reading" standard should rather be limited to cases
in which plaintiffs are trying to enforce a clearly articulated public policy. The
courts would then be acting wholly within their constitutional powers of protect-
ing rights instead of creating rights where none existed before.
Accordingly, it is submitted that the court, in adopting a "fair reading"
standard, should first make sure that public policy has been clearly expressed by
Congress. This may be accomplished by reviewing the statute itself and by
analyzing its legislative history for clear expressions of that policy.
The court should next investigate the facts of the case and decide whether
or not the plaintiff is one of the parties protected by a "fair reading" of the
statute. This analysis will serve two purposes: (1) by finding that the plaintiff
is a party for whom the statute was designed to offer protection, the court
66 See text accompanying notes 46-49 supra and see especially discussion at note 49
supra.
67 See note 13 supra.
68 See note 31 supra.
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satisfies the second prong of the three-prong Sierra Club test 9 and also assures
itself of presiding over an adversarial proceeding, and (2) by identifying the
injury as exemplary of the conduct which the statute was drafted to avoid, the
court satisfies any concern that such injury is speculative because it acknowl-
edges a chain of causation between plaintiff and defendant that Congress con-
sidered sufficiently foreseeable as to merit statutory provisions to prevent it.
The proposed "fair reading" standard, therefore, is intended as a substitute
for the Supreme Court's "clear implication" standard only where there is a clear
congressional expression of the public policy underlying a statute. The federal
courts should determine the applicability of this proposed standard on the basis
of the existence or absence of a clear statement of public policy. It is contended
that if Congress has eliminated judicial fear of increased government by litigation
by expressly articulating public policy, the courts should allow plaintiffs standing
to sue if such standing can be "fairly read" from the appropriate statutory
authority.
S. David Worhatch
69 See note 11 supra.
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